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SETTING THE “PERSECUTOR BAR” FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM 
AFTER NEGUSIE 
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) 
David A. Karp∗ 
After night fell in the port city of Massawra, Eritrea, Daniel Girmai 
Negusie slipped out of the military prison where he had been held for 
four years.1 During the day, he hid at a friend’s house; at night, he 
swam out to container ships anchored off the coast of the Red Sea.2 On 
his fifth night, Negusie, twenty-eight years old, slipped into a luggage 
container with an air hole aboard a tanker, the Atlantic Forest.3 He said 
later that he did not know where the ship was headed.4 
When the Atlantic Forest arrived a month later on December 14, 
2004, in Morehead City, North Carolina, crew members found Negusie 
and two other stowaways inside the containers.5 Negusie had the 
equivalent of $10.60 in Eritrean money on him.6 
Negusie told immigration officials that if sent back to Eritrea, he 
would be killed for deserting7 and for converting to Christianity.8 He 
applied for political asylum9 and withholding of removal10 from the 
United States based on a “well-founded fear of persecution.”11 But an 
immigration judge denied his application,12 and the Board of 
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 1. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 15, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) 
(No. 07-499). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; see also CIA, The World Factbook, Eritrea, Map, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub 
lications/the-world-factbook/geos/er.html (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 4. Government Exhibit No. 1, Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 
235(b)(1) of the Act, Negusse v. Gonzales , 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (No. 06-
1382). 
 5. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15; Record of Sworn Statement, 
supra note 4, at 2; see also Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615, at *1. 
 6. Record of Sworn Statement, supra note 4, at 2; see also CoinMill.com-The Currency 
Converter, Eritrean Nakfa and United States Dollars, http://coinmill.com/ERN_USD.html#ERN 
=160 (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 7. Record of Sworn Statement, supra note 4, at 3. 
 8. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 14. Record of Sworn Statement, 
supra note 4, at 3. 
 9. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2008); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) 
(West 2009).  
 10. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (West 2006). 
 11. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant must show that he is unable or 
unwilling to return to his country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion . . . .” Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1). 
 12. Government Exhibit No. 7, Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, Negusse v. 
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Immigration Appeals (BIA)13 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed.14 
While the immigration judge found that Negusie had been 
conscripted into the army and then abused in prison in Eritrea,15 the 
judge also determined that Negusie had been forced to work as a prison 
guard, a position in which he helped punish others.16 Thus, federal law 
treated Negusie both as a victim and as a perpetrator.17 Although he had 
been forced—at gunpoint—to act as an accomplice to persecution,18 
federal law imposed a black-and-white bar on granting political asylum 
to anyone who helped persecute others.19 The law did not allow 
immigration officials to consider the moral culpability of the persecutor, 
or to evaluate whether the persecutor was coerced.20 As the Fifth Circuit 
explained, “The question whether an alien was compelled to assist 
authorities is irrelevant, as is the question whether the alien shared the 
authorities’ intentions.”21 
With help from a group of Yale law students,22 Negusie appealed to 
                                                                                                                     
Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (No. 06-1382). Many of the court 
documents spell Daniel Girmai Negusie’s name different ways, and INS officials originally 
processed him as Daniel Nugsa-Ghirmay. See Government Exhibit No. 3 at 2, Record of 
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 
2007) (No. 06-1382). Negusie—who may have limited knowledge of English—spelled his own 
name incorrectly in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus he filed while imprisoned at the 
Tensas Paris Detention Center in Waterproof, Louisiana. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 at 1, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 
2007) (No. 06-1382). Despite this confusion, all the cited cases refer to the same person. 
 13. Government Exhibit No. 9, Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re 
Daniel Girmai Negusie at 3, Negusse v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 708615 (W.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) 
(No. 06-1382). 
 14. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x. 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 15. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 7, 11–12. While the judge 
had doubts about Negusie’s testimony, the judge found Negusie’s testimony “largely credible” 
and accepted that the testimony reflected what actually happened. Id. at 7, 12. 
 16. Id. at 9–11. 
 17. Because the immigration judge found that Negusie participated in persecution of a 
protected class under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2009), he denied him political asylum 
and withholding of removal. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
However, the judge found that Negusie would likely be tortured if returned to Eritrea. Id. at 13. 
Therefore, the judge deferred removal under the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 14. Deferral, 
unlike withholding or political asylum, does not entitle Negusie to remain permanently in the 
United States. See Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 16 & n.5. Negusie may 
be detained at any time by the Department of Homeland Security and may be deported to a 
country where he is not likely to be tortured. See id.  
 18. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15. 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2008); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (West 2009). The 
statute states: “The term ‘refugee’ does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 20. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x. 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 21. Id. (citing Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 22. Press Release, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic Wins Victory No. 2 in 
Negusie v. Holder (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/9252.htm. 
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the United States Supreme Court.23 In March, the Court reversed.24 In 
an 8-to-1 decision,25 the Court held that federal law did not require 
officials evaluating Negusie’s political asylum application to ignore 
whether he had been coerced into persecuting others.26 But rather than 
decide the full meaning of the federal law, the Court sent Negusie’s 
case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals.27 It instructed the BIA, 
an executive arm of the Justice Department whose members are 
appointed by and serve the Attorney General,28 to first interpret the 
ambiguity in the law.29 
By remanding the case back to the executive branch, the Court 
displayed the type of “judicial modesty” that Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr. has touted as a hallmark of judicial restraint.30 The Court’s 
limited decision allowed the Court to speak with near unanimity and 
eliminated any appearance that the Court was crafting immigration 
policy from the bench. The decision also placed the complicated public 
policy choice at the heart of Negusie’s case before the politically-
accountable executive branch. It allowed Attorney General Eric Holder 
to craft immigration policy that balances international relations, 
humanitarian concerns, and America’s intolerance of persecution. 
Yet, as Justice John Paul Stevens argued in a separate opinion,31 the 
Court did not abdicate its responsibility to “say what the law is.”32 The 
Court reserved the right under the Chevron doctrine33 to review the 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1161 (2009). Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion, 
which was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Justice David Souter, Justice Samuel 
Alito and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id at 1162. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, id. at 
1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Stephen Breyer concurred 
in part and dissented in part, id. at 1170 (Stevens, J. and Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), and Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate 
concurring opinion, id. at 1168 (Scalia, J. and Alito, J., concurring).  
 26. Id. at 1162 (majority opinion).  
 27. Id. 
 28. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRAC. MANUAL  1, § 1.1(a), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm (last visited June 26, 2009); U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 29. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167–68. 
 30. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.). For another discussion of judicial modesty, see 
William H. Pryor Jr., The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1007 (2008). 
 31. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 33. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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BIA’s interpretation to ensure that it complied with Congress’ intent.34 
Thus, Negusie stands as an example of the Roberts Court’s pragmatism 
and shows the wisdom of deferring to the political branches in close 
calls of statutory interpretation.35  
The complexity of Negusie’s case, which presented questions of 
foreign affairs, international law, and Congress’ plenary immigration 
power, illustrates why courts so often ask the political branches to settle 
these types of policy issues. Negusie was born in the Horn of Africa, a 
region beset by malnutrition, human rights abuses, and war. Almost 
two-thirds of Ethiopia’s population is illiterate,36 and an estimated 
980,000 people live with AIDS.37 According to Amnesty International, 
human rights violations are rampant amid this poverty.38 The Eritrean 
government banned minority religions in 2002, arrested hundreds of 
believers, and held them without trial.39 The government regularly 
jails—and sometimes tortures—political opponents, and forces children 
into military service.40 If children try to escape conscription, they may 
be killed or their family members may be tortured.41 
Negusie was eighteen years old when soldiers surrounded a movie 
theater in Eritrea and forced him into labor.42 He worked for a month in 
a salt mine before being pressed into military service.43 He served as a 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168. 
 35. This Comment does not consider whether, as a general matter, the Roberts Court has 
displayed judicial modesty in the body of its work. For a discussion of that broader topic, see 
Roger Pilon, Foreword: The Roberts Court Emerges: Restrained or Active? to ROGER PILON &  
MARK MOLLER, CATO: SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2006–2007, at vii (2007); Frank B. Cross, 
Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1251 (2008); David 
J. Garrow, Response, The Three Rs: Rosen, Roberts, and Restraint, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 13 
(2007); Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law & Roberts’s Revolution of 
Restraint, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 495 (2007); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, 
and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533 (2008); Mark Tushnet, The First 
(and Last?) Term of the Roberts Court, 42 TULSA L. REV. 495 (2007). 
 36. Country Profile: Ethiopia, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072164.stm (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 37. CIA, The World Factbook, Ethiopia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/et.html (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 38. AMNESTY INT’ L, ERITREA–AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2008, at 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/Eritrea/report-2008. 
 39. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT’ L, ERITREA: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION 15–17 (2005), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR64/013/2005/en/62b61e58-d499-
11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/afr640132005en.pdf. In 2002, Eritrea officially recognized the 
Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran churches, as well as Islam. About half of the country is 
Orthodox Christian, and about 48% is Islamic. Profile: Eritrea, U.S. Department of State, April 
2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2854.htm (last visited June 26, 2009). 
 40. AMNESTY INT’ L, ERITREA: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, supra note 39, at 16. 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2006, 
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: AFRICA: ERITREA (2007), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78733.htm. 
 42. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 13. 
 43. Id. at 14. 
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gunner on a boat patrolling the Red Sea, but said he never fired on 
anyone during his tour.44 When the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
erupted again, Negusie refused to fight.45 Negusie’s captors placed him 
in solitary confinement for six months, and then forced him into hard 
labor for a year and a half.46 When Negusie converted to Protestant 
Christianity in prison, he said he was punished for two weeks.47 For 
talking to fellow Christians in the prison, guards beat him and forced 
him to roll on the ground in the hot sun.48 
In 2001, nearly seven years after he was first taken, Negusie’s 
captors told him to serve as a prison guard.49 If he refused, they would 
kill him.50 By accepting the post, Negusie arguably moved in the eyes 
of American law from victim to accomplice. As a guard, he carried a 
gun.51 He was posted at the prison’s gate to prevent prisoners from 
leaving.52 He also kept prisoners from showering and getting fresh air.53
Negusie saw at least one person die after being left for two hours in 
intense heat without water.54 He stood by and did nothing.55 
Although a guard, Negusie was also a prisoner.56 Negusie carried a 
gun, but he was not allowed to leave the prison.57 When he disobeyed 
orders, Negusie was punished.58 Negusie also tried to help prisoners 
when he could. At night, he let inmates take showers in secret.59 He 
smuggled food, water, and cigarettes to prisoners from time to time.60 
Despite Negusie’s aid to prisoners and his own prisoner status, the 
Fifth Circuit held that even Negusie’s limited participation in 
persecution prevented him from receiving political asylum in the United 
States.61 Under federal law, it did not matter that Negusie may have 
been forced into persecuting others. In reaching this conclusion, the 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. Negusie, who was born in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa and whose mother 
is Ethiopian, refused to fight against Ethiopia because he said he considered Ethiopians his 
“brothers.” Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 14–15. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2009). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162–63. 
 54. Id. at 1163. 
 55. Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 12, at 6; see also Negusie, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1163. 
 56. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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Fifth Circuit relied first on its own interpretation in Bah v. Ashcroft62 
that “the syntax of the statute suggests that the alien’s personal 
motivation is not relevant.”63 The court reasoned that if Congress had 
wanted to make the alien’s motivation an issue, it could have drafted the 
law to reflect this goal.64 
The Fifth Circuit, similar to other circuits that have interpreted the 
persecutor bar,65 also based its decision on the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Fedorenko v. United States.66 In Fedorenko, the Court found no mens 
rea requirement in the Displaced Persons Act’s (DPA) persecutor bar.67 
Because the Court found no intent requirement in the DPA, other 
circuits reasoned that the persecutor bar for political asylum claims 
likewise did not require intent.68 
Fedorenko involved a Nazi guard who had worked at the infamous 
Treblinka concentration camp and applied after the war for U.S. 
citizenship under the DPA.69 Congress passed the DPA in 1948 to allow 
European refugees to emigrate to the United States, but excluded any 
person who “‘assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]’ 
or . . . ‘voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their 
operations. . . .’”70 Fedorenko lied on his visa application,71 and when 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 63. Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003). Bah reflects the type of horrific 
cases that U.S. Immigration & Custom Enforcement evaluates. Amadu Bah lived in Koidu, 
Sierra Leone, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured his family, incinerated his 
father, raped and killed his sister, and then threatened to kill Bah if he refused to join the RUF. 
Id. at 349. As an RUF member, Bah was ordered to shoot female prisoners and used a machete 
to chop off the hands, legs, and heads of civilians. Id. at 350. When he refused, soldiers poured 
palm oil on his back and placed him on his back to burn him. Id. He escaped by stealing the 
British passport of a tourist in Sierra Leone’s capital, and used it to fly through the United 
Kingdom to Houston, Texas, where he applied for political asylum. Id at 349–50. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Several circuit courts of appeals split on whether the persecutor bar permitted the 
government to consider an applicant’s intent. The Fifth and Second Circuits held that the law 
did not allow the government to consider intent. See id. at 351; Xie v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 434 F.3d 136, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2006). The Eighth Circuit disagreed. 
Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2001). The First and Ninth Circuits, while 
not directly addressing the issue, suggested that the persecutor bar contemplated a person’s 
moral culpability. Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2007); Vukmirovic 
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 66. See Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Fedorenko v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)). 
 67. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512. 
 68. See Xie, 434 F.3d at 141 (“[I]nasmuch as the INA and the DPA were enacted for 
similar purposes—to enable refugees to find sanctuary in the United States in the wake of 
World War II—we find it unlikely that the phrase ‘assisted in persecution’ implicitly includes a 
voluntariness requirement in one statute but not the other.”). Note that the persecutor bar in the 
1980 Refugee Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) discussed in Xie. See 
Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162. 
 69. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494–98. 
 70. Id. at 495 (citation omitted). 
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the government discovered his true identity, Fedorenko argued that the 
Nazis had forced him to serve as a concentration camp guard.72 Because 
Congress had included the word “voluntary” in one part of the DPA, the 
Fedorenko Court reasoned that the absence of the word “voluntary” in 
another subpart of the DPA meant that Congress wanted to exclude all 
persons who persecuted others—whether they were coerced to do so or 
not.73 “‘We are not at liberty to imply a condition which is opposed to 
the explicit term of the statute,’” the Court wrote.74 “‘To [so] hold . . . is 
not to construe the Act but to amend it.’”75 
In Negusie, the Court wrote that the Fifth Circuit, four other circuit 
courts, and the BIA made a mistake by relying on Fedorenko.76 
Fedorenko interpreted the World War II-era DPA, passed in 1948 to 
deal with “the Holocaust and its horror.”77 The Refugee Act of 1980, 
which governed Negusie’s political asylum claims, came from a 
different era. Congress passed the Refugee Act to implement 
immigration policy broadly,78 particularly after the Indochina “boat 
people” refugee crisis and the resettlement of thousands of Soviet Jews 
at the end of the Cold War.79 
Moreover, the Refugee Act did not contain the same textual 
structure so critical to the interpretation of the DPA in Fedorenko. In 
the DPA, Congress included “voluntary” in one part of the statute, but 
not in another subpart.80 This absence arguably demonstrated Congress’ 
intent. By contrast, Congress did not use “voluntary” in any subpart of 
the 1980 Refugee Act, “so its omission cannot carry the same 
significance,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court.81 These two 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 496, 509. 
 72. Id. at 500–01. 
 73. Id. at 512–14 (“The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal 
interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual’s service as a concentration camp 
armed guard—whether voluntary or involuntary—made him ineligible for a visa.”). 
 74. Id. at 513 (quoting Detroit Trust Co. v. Barlum S.S. Co., 293 U.S. 21, 38 (1934)).  
 75. Id. 
 76. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 1165–66. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’ L MIGRATION REV. 145–46 
(1981). 
 80. The government pointed out, however, that the INA contains other provisions that 
mention voluntariness. For example, the law does not bar a person who was an “involuntary” 
member of a totalitarian party from admission to the United States. Brief for the Respondent in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) 
(No. 07-499) (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (West 2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1424(d) (2006)). 
Negusie’s attorneys countered that the provisions cited by the government do not deal with 
persecution or asylum, and were passed in 1952, twenty-eight years before Congress inserted 
the 1980 persecutor bar. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 45 & n.13. Thus, 
the existence of voluntariness in an earlier, different part of the statute does not show anything 
about Congress’ intent in 1980. Id  at 45 n.13. 
 81. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165. 
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differences show why “Fedorenko, which addressed a different statute 
enacted for a different purpose, does not control the BIA’s 
interpretation of this persecutor bar” in Negusie.82 
By casting aside the importance of Fedorenko, the Court in Negusie 
decided that the persecutor bar did not prohibit the government from 
considering an applicant’s culpability in persecuting others.83 But 
Negusie wanted the Court to take its decision one step further—and 
declare that the statute required the government to consider 
culpability.84 Instead,85 the Court asked the executive branch to interpret 
the law first.86 
In doing so, the Court argued that the interpretation of the law rested 
primarily in the agency’s, rather than the Court’s, hands.87 Under the 
Chevron doctrine, courts engage in a two-step analysis of the law. First, 
courts ask whether Congress created a gap that it intended agencies to 
fill. Second, courts ask if the agency’s interpretation of the gap is 
reasonable. If so, courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation.88 The 
Court gives particular deference to immigration officials, who 
“‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate 
questions of foreign relations.’”89 
On one hand, the Court’s choice to remand the case to the BIA—a 
board appointed by the Attorney General to act as his agent—raises 
profound questions about our system of separation of powers.90 If the 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Id. at 1166. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 1, at 32. 
 85. Justice Antonin Scalia made it clear that the BIA could interpret the statute in the 
exact same way it had in Negusie’s case if it offered an independent, reasoned explanation 
based on agency expertise and policy judgment for its interpretation. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia wrote: 
[I] do not endorse any particular rule. It is to agency officials, not to the 
Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among 
permissible interpretations of the statute. They deserve to be told clearly 
whether we are serious about allowing them to exercise that discretion, or are 
rather firing a warning shot across the bow. 
Id.  
 86. Id. at 1168. 
 87. Id. (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–
17 (2002)). 
 88. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
For a discussion of the Chevron doctrine in the immigration context, see Jeffrey A. Bekiares, 
Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—Regulating Away Alien Eligibility for Adjustment of 
Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 
721–24 (2006). 
 89. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163–64 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); see also Bekiares, supra note 88, at 721. 
 90. Negusie also highlights the important role oral argument plays in the Court’s decision-
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/12
2009] CASE COMMENT 941 
 
Constitution in Article III gives courts the power to interpret the law, 
courts arguably should not pass this power to the administrative state, 
with its entrenched bureaucracy and capture by special interest.91 The 
Constitution gives the federal judiciary independence and life-tenure92 
precisely so that judges can interpret the law without political 
interference. 
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the Chevron 
doctrine,93 sharply criticized the Court’s transfer of power to the 
executive branch.94 He wrote that the Court had distorted the balance 
struck in Chevron95—Chevron only instructed courts to defer to the 
executive branch when agencies implement policy pursuant to 
Congressional authorization. Chevron did not give agencies the power 
to replace the federal courts. “Courts are expert at statutory 
construction, while agencies are expert at statutory implementation,” 
Stevens wrote.96 “That the distinction can be subtle does not lessen its 
importance.”97 
While Justice Stevens’ distinction appears sound in the abstract, the 
broad language of the persecutor bar folds interpretation and 
implementation into one step. To give the word “persecute” a moral 
dimension, a court must define what type of conduct transforms the 
persecuted into a persecutor. Any test the court might create could 
                                                                                                                     
making process. Justice Anthony Kennedy, author of the Court’s opinion, forecast his thinking 
by asking Negusie’s attorney the first question of the argument about Chevron deference. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499). In 
his opinion, Justice Kennedy then seized on the concession in oral argument by Negusie’s 
attorney that the BIA could construe a duress defense broadly or narrowly. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1164. For a discussion of the role of oral argument in decision-making, see Stephen A. 
Higginson, Constitutional Advocacy Explains Constitutional Outcomes, 60 FLA. L. REV. 857, 
858 (2008), and David A. Karp, Note, Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 611 (2009).  
 91. For a discussion of these questions, see Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron 
and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. 
L. REV. 301, 307–08 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation 
and the Courts, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &  MGMT. 517, 517 (1986). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 94. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1171 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Of 
course, the BIA, to which the Attorney General delegates authority, had already interpreted the 
statute. But the Court found the BIA’s interpretation invalid because the BIA mechanically—
and incorrectly—relied on Fedorenko as dictating its interpretation. Id. “An agency’s assertion 
that it is compelled to adopt a particular interpretation by the statutory text or by judicial 
precedents is not reasoned decisionmaking.” Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, sup a note 1, 
at 47 (citing FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 
U.S. 80, 89–90 (1943)). 
 95. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1171.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
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hardly capture the range of moral judgments officials must make in 
evaluating a political asylum claim. This line drawing between willing 
behavior and forced cruelty becomes especially trying when captors 
force their victims to switch sides and torture others. 
Consider the agonizing cases coming before immigration courts in 
the executive branch. One case weighed the political asylum claim of a 
child soldier from Uganda, forced into military training at the age of 
fifteen.98 Rebel soldiers “forced [the boy] to kill his friend, to watch the 
murder of his parents, and to view the mutilation of innocent 
civilians.”99 In Ethiopia, a thirteen-year-old boy was given a choice: 
serve as a soldier on the Ethiopian front or face abuse in prison, where 
jailers hung the boy upside down, burnt him, beat him on the soles of 
his feet, and deprived him of food and water.100 Scores of asylum 
applications come from countries such as Burma, Columbia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Peru, Somalia, and the Sudan, where militia 
groups are known to force children into military service. 101 
In ordinary cases, courts look to agencies to first interpret 
ambiguous statutes based on agency expertise. “The agency can bring 
its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can 
make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed 
discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its 
decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.”102 The agency’s 
expertise becomes especially useful in cases such as Negusie’s, where 
an agency gains insight from evaluating hundreds of asylum claims 
from around the world. With this experience, the agency can better 
balance foreign policy, humanitarian concerns, and this nation’s 
unwillingness to provide refuge to persecutors.  
By sending the case back to the Justice Department, the Court 
retained its role under Chevron to review the executive branch’s 
interpretation and implementation of the persecutor bar. Yet the Court 
also strengthened its legitimacy by showing restraint in this case.103 The 
Court’s role as an independent and unelected branch becomes most 
valuable when the Court reviews laws that protect a politically 
powerless minority. But the Court’s place in the constitutional order 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164–65, 168–170 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 99. Id. at 170. 
 100. Brief of Human Rights First et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Negusie v. 
Holder, at 11–15, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499). 
 101. Initial Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 9–11, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 
(2009) (No. 07-499). 
 102. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002). 
 103. For an article illustrating the courts’ failure to clearly interpret another provision of 
immigration law, see Natalie Liem, Note, Mean What You Say, Say What You Mean: Defining 
the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More Than Aggravated Felons, 59 FLA. 
L. REV. 1071, 1084–87 (2007). 
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does not carry the same force in certain areas, such as immigration and 
foreign policy, where the politically accountable branches have more 
expertise and flexibility to implement the people’s will. The Court 
wisely placed Negusie’s case in the hands the Justice Department, 
which should now devise a humane policy to deal with this daunting 
moral dilemma. 
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